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TAKING PARLIAMENTARY 
SOVEREIGNTY SERIOUSLY 







[The Victorian Government has made a commitment to consult with the 
community on how best to protect and promote human rights in Victoria. 
To this end, it has established a Human Rights Consultation Committee to 
undertake this consultation and to report on the desirability or otherwise 
of enacting a Bill of Rights. The government has, however, indicated its 
preference for a statutory Bill of Rights and one that preserves the 'sover-
eignty of Parliament'. This article takes those two government preferences 
as its baseline and then explores what might follow if the preservation of 





In May 2005, the Victorian Government published a Statement of Intent on Human 
Rights.1 Its purpose was to begin a rights dialogue with the Victorian community 
and to outline the government’s preferred model for rights protection. At the same 
time, the Human Rights Consultation Committee was established with the mandate 
to consult widely in the community on how best to protect and promote human 
rights in Victoria. It is asked to report by 30 November 2005 with recommendations 
* School of Law, Deakin University. My thanks to Andrew Lynch, Adam McBeth and Tom Poole for 
providing invaluable feedback on earlier drafts of this article.  
 
1 Victorian Government, Statement of Intent: Human Rights in Victoria (May 2004), available at 
<http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/humanrights> (last visited Aug. 2 2005).  
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on a suitable rights framework “based on the preferences expressed in [the] State-
ment of Intent and the views of the Victorian community expressed in the submis-
sions that it receives and in subsequent consultations that it may undertake.”2
 
The Statement of Intent makes clear, however, that the government favours a statu-
tory Bill of Rights of the kind operating in New Zealand, the United Kingdom and 
the Australian Capital Territory. These models enshrine a range of civil and politi-
cal rights in an ordinary statute3 and when a new law is introduced into the Parlia-
ment, the government must certify its compatibility or otherwise with the Bill of 
Rights.4 In addition, the courts have an important but limited role in the protection 
of rights. They can make a declaration of a law’s incompatibility with the Bill of 
Rights but have no power to invalidate it on this ground.5  
 
This article will take the above characteristics of the government’s preferred model 
as a baseline then explore more fully what may follow from that part of the State-
ment of Intent which states that “[t]he Government is concerned to ensure that the 
sovereignty of Parliament is preserved in any new approaches that might be adopted 
to human rights.”6 It is my argument that if parliamentary sovereignty7 is taken 
seriously within a rights framework then a statutory (Victorian) Bill of Rights might 
include the following: 
 
• A rigorous system of pre-legislative scrutiny to include an expert, 
independent public body and sometimes the courts in addition to 
that undertaken by the Parliament and the Executive. 
 
2 Id.  
3 Part III of the Human Rights Act, 2004 (ACT), for example, contains most of the rights found in the 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. They include the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person; the freedom of movement, thought, conscience, religion, belief, expression and 
association; and the protection of family and children and from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.   
4 See Human Rights Act, 2004, s 37 (ACT); Human Rights Act, 1998, s 19 (UK); Cf New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act, 1990, s 7 (NZ) where the Attorney General need only alert the Parliament when a Bill 
appears to be inconsistent with a protected right or freedom.  
5 See Human Rights Act, 2004, s 32 (ACT); Human Rights Act, 1998, s 4 (UK); Cf New Zealand where 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, (NZ) does not provide Courts with the power to make a 
declaration of incompatibility. But in Moonen v. Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 
(NZ, High Court of New Zealand) the New Zealand High Court held that when a law is found to be 
inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, (NZ) they can make a declaration of 
inconsistency. For a critique of the Moonen decision see James Allan, Take Heed Australia – A Statutory 
Bill of Rights and its Inflationary Effect, 6 DEAKIN L. REV. 322, 327-333 (2001). 
6 STATEMENT OF INTENT, supra note 1. 
7 I shall use the phrase parliamentary sovereignty in the remainder of the article for the sake of consis-
tency with the terminology used in the Statement of Intent. But note that term parliamentary sovereignty 
in its strong, Diceyian sense is inappropriate in the Australian context where the Australian Constitution 
creates a federal system that divides legislative, executive and judicial power between two levels of 
government, State and Commonwealth. Moreover, it established a final court of appeal – the High Court 
– with the power to invalidate legislative and executive action that offends the Constitution. See contra 
note 47 and accompanying text for Dicey’s definition of parliamentary sovereignty.   
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• The power of judicial review of delegated legislation when in-
compatible with the Bill of Rights. 
 
• The application of the Bill of Rights to all public bodies and to 
any person or body that performs a public function, power or 
duty. 
 
• The express recognition that a remedy lies against a person or 
body to whom the Bill of Rights applies for the exercise of a pub-
lic function, power or duty in a manner which offends a protected 
right(s).    
 
II STRENGTHENING THE SYSTEM OF                                                    
PRE-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY 
The Bills of Rights in New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the Australian Capital 
Territory include a number of mechanisms that provide for meaningful pre-
legislative scrutiny by the parliament and the executive. These include the estab-
lishment of parliamentary committees to assess the rights impact of proposed laws 
and the duty to report their findings to the Parliament.8 And the introduction of a 
law into the Parliament must be accompanied by a statement, made either by the 
Attorney-General or relevant Minister, as to its compatibility or otherwise with the 
Bill of Rights.9
 
However a rights framework in which parliamentary sovereignty is taken seriously 
may also glean something of value from the organising principle of the post-
revolutionary French Constitution. And that is a distinct conception of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine where the judicial function is subordinated to that of the 
parliament and the executive. This emerged due to “[t]he ideology of the revolution 
[which] was…distinctly anti-judicial”10 and was founded upon that “aspect of the 
[Rousseau] tradition which excludes review of constitutionality by the courts; the 
law (statutes), as the expression of the general will, is virtually equal to the constitu-
tion, and the courts can have no authority to strike it down.”11  
  
The Constitution of 1958 did, however, establish the Conseil Constitutionnel (Con-
stitutional Council).12 Its primary role is to assess the constitutionality of laws 
8 For example, s 38 of the of the Human Rights Act, 2004 (ACT) provides that “[t]he relevant standing 
committee [of the Legislative Assembly] must report to the Legislative Assembly about human rights 
issues raised by bills presented to the Assembly.” A similar procedure for pre-legislative scrutiny 
operates in the UK where the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights reports to the Parliament 
on its assessment of whether proposed laws are compatible with the Human Rights Act, 1998, (UK)  
9 See supra note 4. 
10 Richard J. Cummins, The General Principles of Law, Separation of Powers and Theories of Judicial 
Decision in France, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 594, 599 (1986). 
11 Id.  
12 Constitution of 4 Oct. 1958, arts. 56-63 (France).  
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before they are enacted. It must do so within one month or eight days upon a re-
quest from the government if the matter is urgent.13 A declaration of unconstitution-
ality prevents the passage of the law.14 But once a law is formally enacted the 
Constitutional Council has no power to strike it down. In this way, the organising 
constitutional principle of post-revolutionary France – “the untouchability of the 
statute as the manifestation of the general will”15 – is honoured and maintained.  
 
It is my argument that if parliamentary sovereignty is taken seriously within the 
government’s preferred rights framework then rights scrutiny by a judicial body 
ought to occur before a law is enacted, in addition to that undertaken by the parlia-
ment and the executive under the New Zealand, the United Kingdom and ACT 
models.16 In a Victorian Bill of Rights this could be a two-step process. First, a 
body sufficiently independent parliament and the government, the Equal Opportu-
nity Commission (“EOC”) for example, would assess the compatibility of proposed 
laws against the Bill of Rights. Second, and in the event the EOC considers the 
proposed law incompatible, they would refer the matter to the Court of Appeal of 
the Victorian Supreme Court for an advisory opinion.17 As with the French Consti-
tutional Council, the Court of Appeal would have to do so within a month or earlier 
if the circumstances were urgent or exceptional. In the event the Court of Appeal 
finds the proposed law incompatible with the Bill of Rights the government can still 
proceed with its passage if it wishes to do so.18 But this can only be done after the 
Attorney-General has made a statement of rights compatibility (or otherwise) to the 
Parliament which must include its response to the Court of Appeal’s advisory 
opinion. In this kind of model it would, however, be perfectly reasonable for the 
Attorney-General to still make a compatibility statement based on a reasoned, 
articulated but different conception of the legislative effect on the relevant right.19  
 
For as Jeremy Waldron notes, matters of right “are complex and controversial [and] 
the existence of good faith disagreement is undeniable.”20 When the scope and 
13 Constitution of 4 Oct. 1958, art. 61 (France). 
14 Constitution of 4 Oct. 1958, art. 62 (France). 
15 Cummins, supra note 10, at 602.  
16 It should be noted that the complete exclusion of the courts from a rights framework best preserves 
strong parliamentary sovereignty. But as earlier noted, this article takes as its baseline the government’s 
preferred rights framework which includes an important but limited role for the courts – see supra note 6 
and accompanying text. My thanks to Andrew Lynch for this point.  
17 An advisory opinion involves a court giving its view on a question of law when there is no “immediate 
right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of [a] Court” – Commonwealth v. Queen-
sland (1975) 134 CLR 298, 325 (High Court of Australia, 1975). For this reason an advisory opinion is 
not an exercise of judicial power, the hallmark of which is the determination by a Court of some imme-
diate legal controversy. 
18 It should, however, be noted that this is not the case under the French Constitution of 1958 where 
article 62 states that “[a] provision that has been declared unconstitutional [by the Constitutional Court] 
may neither be promulgated nor applied.” 
19 For example, see Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA 39-46 (Grant Huscroft and Ian Brodie, eds., 2004) for an 
account in the American context of the legislative arm of government providing a well-reasoned and 
moral argument about the nature of religious freedom. 
20 Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. L. S. 18, 49 (1993). 
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content of a right (and often the correlative duty) are inherently contestable, then no 
person or institution can lay claim to definitive wisdom or truth on these matters.21
 
A rights framework that provides for pre-legislative scrutiny by a judicial body 
takes parliamentary sovereignty seriously. For the provision of an advisory opinion 
by a judicial body at this stage of the parliamentary process makes it functionally 
closer to a third legislative chamber than a court.22 Moreover, the provision of a pre-
legislative advisory opinion by a court is, in my view, more sensitive to and ac-
commodating of the reality of disagreements about rights than a post-enactment 
incompatibility declaration. The notion of an opinion recognises that this is the 
court’s view as to the content or scope of a right and not that a definitive and final 
rights determination is being (or even can be) made. This acknowledges, quite 
properly in my view, that there is “much room…for honest and good faith dis-
agreement among citizens on the topic of rights”23 and that judges, though capable 
of making an important and valuable contribution to this end, do not have a mort-
gage on rights wisdom.24 And the provision of advisory opinion rather than an 
incompatibility declaration may prove more conducive to the kind of meaningful 
and balanced rights dialogue between the arms of government that some consider a 
key virtue of statutory Bills of Rights.25 Thomas Poole, for example, has made the 
following observation regarding the operation of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) 
(“UK HRA”):  
 
[An] unintended side-effect of the hybrid system is that it seems to encour-
age courts to interpret their way to results rather than referring them back 
to the legislature for a final decision. This at least has been the experience 
of the United Kingdom, where judges have tended to use (sometimes 
rather boldly) the power granted by section 3 of the Human Rights Act to 
read and give effect to legislation in a way which is compatible with the 
21 See Id. at 28-31 and 49-51; Tom Campbell, Democracy, Human Rights and Positive Law, 16 SYDNEY 
L.REV. 195, 200-4 (1994). 
22 This point is made in relation to the French Constitutional Court by Martin Shapiro, Judicial Review in 
France, J.L. & POL’Y 531, 536-548. In addition, vesting such a power in the Victorian Court of Appeal 
would not, in my view, offend the principle derived from Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 
(NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 (High Court of Australia, 1996). The power to provide an advisory opinion 
on a question of law would not impair “its institutional integrity [in a manner that is] incompatible with 
its role as a repository of federal jurisdiction” – Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 4-3 (High Court 
of Australia, 2004). 
23 Waldron, supra note 20, at 49.  
24 I am in agreement with James Allan, Tom Campbell and Jeremy Waldron amongst others to the extent 
that judges do not “have some sort of pipeline to heavenly wisdom and that their views are a better 
indication of truth than elected legislators’ views on the questions of which statutory provisions are 
inconsistent with the BOR rights and of whether they are anyway reasonable or justified.” (Allan, supra 
note 5, at 328) I am, however, in favour of giving courts an important but limited role in a Victorian 
rights framework. Even if courts are not (quite properly) given the final say on questions of rights, it 
seems wrong to me to deny the important contribution they have made (and still make) in other jurisdic-
tions and imprudent to eschew the vast reservoir of international rights jurisprudence now available. 
25 See, for example, in the ACT context: ACT BILL OF RIGHTS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, TOWARDS 
AN ACT HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: REPORT OF THE ACT BILL OF RIGHTS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE 61-63 
(May 2003); Julie Debeljak, The Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT): A Significant, Yet Incomplete, Step 
Toward the Domestic Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 15 PUBLIC L. REV. 169 (2004).  
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Convention rights rather than their power to issue declarations of incom-
patibility under section 4…[T]his choice, when viewed from a dialogic 
standpoint, may be counted as a failure since it achieves the opposite of 
what a dialogue model sets out to achieve.26
 
And even when a post-enactment incompatibility declaration is made, it may oper-
ate to close down any further institutional rights dialogue though the final (legal) 
say remains with the Parliament. The institutional authority of Australian courts and 
the respect generally accorded to their decisions may make their rights determina-
tions definitive in the eyes of many and therefore off limits to the legislature as a 
practical matter.27 Providing for scrutiny by a judicial body before rather than after 
the enactment of a law will not, of course, remedy this. But given time, a mecha-
nism that provides for of an advisory (rights) opinion may come to be understood 
and accepted as part and parcel of a wider parliamentary process (and contingent 
for that reason) not a final, judicial rights determination.28  
 
III INVALIDATION OF INCOMPATIBLE DELEGATED LEGISLATION 
In its report “Towards an ACT Human Rights Act”, the ACT Bill of Rights Consul-
tative Committee (“Consultative Committee”) noted that the UK HRA was “care-
fully designed to avoid encroaching directly on the traditional principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty.”29 One important manifestation of this concern and 
principle was the power vested in the courts to invalidate delegated legislation 
incompatible with the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (“ACT HRA”) unless author-
ised by the parent Act.30  The Consultative Committee recommended a similar 
power for the ACT HRA but this was not acted upon.31
 
But as Julie Debeljak notes, “[t]here is no threat to parliamentary sovereignty in the 
judiciary invalidating delegated legislation that the primary legislator has not 
authorised.”32  Indeed if parliamentary sovereignty is taken seriously, then this 
invalidation power must be included within the government’s preferred rights 
framework. By securing executive responsibility and accountability (in this instance 
for the rights impact of its laws) to the parliament, it does no more than ensure that 
so far as possible the will of Parliament as expressed in (human rights) law is pre-
26 Thomas Poole, Bills of Rights in Australia, 4 OXFORD U.C.L.J. 197, 202-203 (2004)  
27 On this point see Carolyn Evans, Responsibility for Rights: The ACT Human Rights Act, 32 FEDERAL 
L.REV. 291, 298-299 (2004); Waldron, supra note 19, at 47.   
28 See supra note 22 for my response to the possible objection to this component of a Victorian rights 
framework based on the Kable principle. 
29 See ACT BILL OF RIGHTS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, supra note 25, [3.41]. 
30 Human Rights Act, 2004, ss 3 & 4 (ACT)  
31 But see Evans, supra note 27, at 303 for an interesting observation that the exclusion of the power for 
courts to invalidate delegated legislation may not prevent this from occurring if there is a “[q]uestion of 
whether a broad delegation of power implicitly included the right to behave in a manner that disregarded 
the rights in the Act”. 
32 Debeljak, supra note 25, at 175. 
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served and promoted.33 It is all the more desirable (and urgent) a reform in my view, 
when so much Australian law now promulgated is delegated rather than primary 
legislation34 and the defining characteristic of our political system is executive 
dominance not responsible government.35  
 
IV THE APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
Stephen Gardbaum notes that “among the most fundamental issues in constitutional 
law is the scope of application of individual rights provisions”.36 Whether, for 
example, a framework for the protection of rights has a horizontal as well as verti-
cal effect ? That is, do “rights regulate only the conduct of governmental actors in 
their dealing with private individuals (vertical) or also relations between private 
individuals (horizontal)”37? The problem has arisen most recently in the ACT. 
Section 4 states that the ACT HRA “applies to all Territory laws”38 but is silent as to 
whether this exhausts the scope of its application. As Carolyn Evans explains, 
 
[i]n the case of administrative law this leaves some complex issues in the 
hands of the judiciary. For example, to what extent are private bodies ex-
ercising public powers to be subjected to the Act ? What are public powers 
in this context ? Does the Act apply to Cabinet decisions or deliberations ? 
Does it extend to exercise of non-statutory executive powers ? Outside the 
administrative law context the absence of an application clause also leads 
to some difficult questions, including whether and to what extent the 
courts are bound by the Act (for example, in the administration of justice, 
in the development of the common law) and whether it might have a hori-
zontal effect between private parties. If this Act was intended to assert the 
primacy of the legislative authority in rights protection it is hard to under-
stand why such crucial issues were left to judges.39
 
If parliamentary sovereignty is taken seriously within the government’s preferred 
rights framework, then in my view two points emerge from the application ambigu-
33 This might also be done through the pre-legislative rights scrutiny of Victorian delegated legislation. 
For example, s 10 of the Subordinate Legislation Act, 1994, (Vic) could be amended to require every 
regulatory impact statement to include a statement that the proposed delegated law is rights compatible. 
My thanks to Adam McBeth for this point. 
34 On this point see DENNIS PEARCE & STEPHEN ARGUMENT, DELEGATED LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIA 
7-10 (2d ed. 1999); Justice Michael McHugh, The Growth of Legislation and Litigation, 69 
AUSTRALIAN. L.J. 37, 38-39 (1995).  
35 On how the marriage of responsible government and strict party discipline has resulted in executive 
dominance of the parliament in Australia see Geoffrey Lindell, Responsible Government, in ESSAYS ON 
LAW AND GOVERNMENT – VOLUME 1: PRINCIPLES AND VALUES 75, 93-97 (Paul D. Finn ed., 1995) 
36 Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L.REV. 387, 388 
(2003) 
37 Id.  
38 Human Rights Act, 2004, s 29 (ACT). 
39 Evans, supra note 27, at 304-305 (my emphasis). 
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ity problem in the ACT HRA (and those in other jurisdictions40) and the italicised 
Evans observation in the above quotation. First, the Bill of Rights must make as 
clear as possible those persons and bodies to whom it applies.41 The sovereignty of 
Parliament in this regard - that is the extent to which it wishes to provide rights 
protection - cannot be preserved and promoted by the courts (or other public offi-
cials and bodies) and private (legal) persons without this kind of clear textual guid-
ance. And second, it ought to apply to any person or body that performs a public 
function, power or duty.42 This would include the courts and, assuming the justicia-
bility of the subject matter,43 even decisions made by the Governor in Council or 
when acting on ministerial advice, whether sourced to the Constitution, statute or 
the common law.44 For if the rule of law means that the executive government must 
obey the law, then there is a compelling principle for why all executive or govern-
mental action must be compatible with (human rights) law. 
 
In applying to the courts, a Victorian rights framework would have an indirect 
horizontal effect. Gardbaum explains indirect horizontality in the American consti-
tutional law context in the following terms: 
 
All law, including common law and the law at issue in litigation between 
private individuals, is directly and fully subject to the Constitution…[It] 
does not render private actors bound by the Constitution but it does mean 
that individual rights provisions have significant impact on them. By gov-
erning their legal relations with each other, such rights limit what private 
actors can lawfully be empowered to do and which of their interests, pref-
erences, and actions can be protected by law.45  
40 Id. at 305 where Evans notes that “there is no consensus in other common law countries [such as the 
UK, New Zealand, South Africa or Canada] about issues such as the applicability of human rights 
provisions to parliament, the courts or individuals acting in a public capacity”; see also Gardbaum, supra 
note 36, at 393-411 (Vertical and Horizontal Effect of Individual Rights: The Spectrum of Positions in 
Comparative Constitutional Law).  
41 It should, however, be noted that even in jurisdictions such as the UK where there is express textual 
guidance as to scope of the Human Rights Act, there is still room for ambiguity and disagreement as to 
the person and bodies to whom it applies – see K D Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary 
Democracy, 62 MOD. L. REV. 79, 89-91 (1999)  
42 This is the language found in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, s 3 (NZ). It seems to me that 
it is the nature of the power not the particular person or body that stamps it as being relevantly “public” 
for the purpose of the applicability of a Bill of Rights. On this issue in administrative law more generally 
see Mark Aronson, Is The ADJR Act Hampering the Development of Australian Administrative Law?, 15 
PUBLIC L. REV. 202, 212-213 (2004)   
43 The nature of the subject matter of some prerogative powers – for example the prerogatives relating to 
the control of the armed forces – makes them inappropriate for judicial review. In The Queen v. Toohey; 
Ex parte Northern Land Council, (1981) 151 CLR 170, 220 (High Court of Australia, 1981), Mason J 
that “the cases in which the courts have refused to examine the exercise of prerogative powers reveals 
that most, if not all, of the decisions, can be justified on the ground that the prerogative power in ques-
tion was not, owing to its nature and subject matter, open to challenge for the reason put forward.” On 
the issue of the justiciability of prerogative powers more generally see GEORGE WINTERTON, 
PARLIAMENT, THE EXECUTIVE AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL 134-139 (1983). 
44 On this point more generally see Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 67-68 (2000). 
45 Gardbaum, supra note 36, 390-391. 
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A consequence of indirect horizontality would be the requirement that Victorian 
courts develop the common law in a manner which is rights compatible.46  
 
If parliamentary sovereignty is the power “to make or unmake any law whatever its 
content”,47 then of course it does not require or mandate the extent to which a rights 
framework must apply. That too is a choice for the Parliament. But parliamentary 
sovereignty is also the constitutional recognition of the legal supremacy of the 
parliament over the executive and judicial arms of government. So once the will of 
Parliament is expressed through the enactment of (human rights) law, then in my 
view its sovereignty in this respect is secured if it applies to the executive and 
judicial arms of government and to all manifestations of public power.48  
 
V THE PROVISION OF A REMEDY 
In Part IV of this article I made an argument regarding the extent to which the 
government’s preferred rights framework ought to apply to secure the sovereignty 
of parliament. As a corollary of this, the provision of an appropriate remedy should 
be available for the exercise of a public function, power or duty (whether sourced to 
the prerogative or an otherwise compatible law) in a manner which offends a pro-
tected right(s). The UK HRA, for example, makes it “unlawful for a public authority 
to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”49 and provides that 
“[i]n relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds 
is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, 
within its powers as it considers just and appropriate”.50 This includes an award of 
damages if “the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfac-
tion to the person in whose favour it is made.”51
 
46 This conception of indirect horizontality applies in the UK: Douglas v. Hello! Ltd, [2001] 2 All ER 
289; Venables v. News Group Newspapers Ltd, [2001] 1 All ER 98. In the same way, the High Court of 
Australia has held that whilst the implied freedom of political communication in the Australian Constitu-
tion does not create new private law rights, the common law must be developed to conform with the 
Constitution – Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation, (1997) 189 CLR 520, 556 (High Court of 
Australia, 1997). 
47 ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSITUTION 40 (10th ed. 
1959).  
48 I note here without exploring in any detail the difficulty of framing a clear and unambiguous applica-
tion provision – see supra notes 40-41. However, the comprehensive application provision in s 3 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, (NZ) may provide useful starting point. It reads: This Bill of rights 
applies only to acts done (a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; or (b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function, power, or duty con-
ferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law. In addition, a subsection (c) could be 
inserted that makes clear that the reference in (b) to the judicial branches of government requires the 
courts to develop the common law to conform to the Bill of Rights.  
49 Human Rights Act, 1998, s 6 (UK). 
50 Human Rights Act, 1998, s 8(1) (UK). 
51 Human Rights Act, 1998, s 8(3) (UK). 
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Incorporating similar provisions in a Victorian Bill of Rights would be inconsistent 
with that part of the Statement of Intent where the Government makes clear that it 
“does not wish to create new individual causes of action based on human rights 
breaches.”52 But to do so, again, does no more than secure so far as possible the will 
of the (Victorian) parliament as expressed in (human rights) law. It would be odd 
indeed and contrary to the rule of law, if a parliamentary directive that a range of 
rights are to be protected in Victoria was not applicable to and enforceable against 
those persons and bodies entrusted with the administration of government and the 
performance of the public functions.53 Moreover, as Poole points out: 
 
[T]o deprive aspiring litigants of the most obvious procedural avenue for 
bringing a suit on rights-based grounds must be seen as running counter to 
the whole raison d’etre of a provision for the legal protection of rights.54
 
In relation to litigation between private parties, however, not providing a new, 
freestanding cause of action for rights breaches – direct horizontality - is under-
standable and maybe even desirable. As noted, this is the case with the UK HRA 
model which instead provides for indirect horizontality.55 K D Ewing explains its 
operation in the following terms: 
 
[The] Convention rights may be relied upon in litigation between private 
parties, but cannot themselves be the basis of a cause of action. So al-
though a worker dismissed for a reason incompatible with the Convention 
may not sue his or her employer for a breach of a Convention right, the 
worker in question may be able to sue for wrongful dismissal, claiming 
that a dismissal for a reason incompatible with a Convention right is 
wrongful.56
 
It might be said that, to the extent that existing causes of action may not encompass 
the full range of human rights breaches that may occur between private parties, the 
will of parliament as evinced in (human rights) law is not fully secured. But the 
need for certainty in private law relationships and a healthy respect for individual 
autonomy and privacy are legitimate concerns and important characteristics of a 
liberal democracy. And in any event, my argument that taking parliamentary sover-
eignty seriously entails that a rights framework ought to apply to the judicial and 
executive arms of governments and those persons or bodies that perform public 
functions, powers or duties, is unrelated to purely private zones of conduct. 
 
52 STATEMENT OF INTENT, supra note 1. 
53 The ACT Consultative Committee stated that “[t]he ACT Human Rights Act should provide that all 
public authorities must act in a way or engage in conduct that is compatible with the Human Rights Act, 
unless the incompatible conduct is required by the legislation.” – supra note 25, 73. This was recom-
mendation was not, however, included in the Human Rights Act, 2004 (ACT).  
54 Poole, supra note 26, at 206. 
55 See supra note 46. 
56 Ewing, supra note 41, at 89. 
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VI CONCLUSION  
 This article has argued that if parliamentary sovereignty is to be taken seriously 
within the Victorian government’s preferred rights framework, then the four pro-
posals outlined are worth considering for incorporation. The first two proposals 
preserve the core ideal of parliamentary sovereignty as no person or body can set 
aside a law once enacted (a rigorous system of pre-legislative scrutiny) nor provide 
for its override (the power of judicial review of incompatible delegated legislation).  
 
I have also made an argument that stems from parliamentary sovereignty being the 
constitutional recognition of the legal supremacy of the parliament over the execu-
tive and judicial arms of government. So once the will of Parliament is expressed 
through the enactment of (human rights) law, then its sovereignty in this respect is 
better secured if it applies to the executive and judicial arms of government and all 
manifestations of public power. This should include an express parliamentary 
directive that the courts must develop the common law in a manner that is rights 
compatible. And the corollary of my application proposal is the availability of an 
appropriate remedy in the event that a public function, power or duty - whether 
sourced to the prerogative or an otherwise compatible law - is performed in a man-
ner that offends a protected right(s).  
 
 
 
 
